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COMMENTS
UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL AS A METHOD
OF DETERRING PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGANTS:
A LEGITIMATE METHOD OF ECONOMIC COERCION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The role which the private litigant plays in the enforcement
of the antitrust laws, either by an action to recover treble damages'
or to enjoin antitrust violations,2 is of increasing importance. As
these actions become more frequent, additional problems are raised.
One such problem is the use of a unilateral refusal to deal as a
deterrent to the effective use of the treble damage suit by the
private litigant. Two recent parallel cases have dealt with the
question of allowing temporary injunctive relief where the defend-
ant has refused to deal with a plaintiff asking for treble damages.
In House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,4 the Second
Circuit denied injunctive relief in the above situation, whereas in
Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co.,5 the Third Circuit granted
the injunction pendente lite.
The purpose of this comment is to examine these recent cases
in the light of the interest protected and the propriety of injunctive
relief. Since the two cases involve similar situations but reach
different results, a close examination and comparison of their facts
and a discussion of the possible implications of their holdings is
1 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district court in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2 1njunctive relief is provided for in § 16 of the Clayton Act. "Any person
... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief ... against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws ... when
and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief.., is
granted by courts of equity .... " 38 STAT. 737 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
3 The number of private suits has only recently become of significant
proportions. This has resulted in more successful treble damage re-
coveries of substantial amounts. See Bicks, The Department of Justice
and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTrRUST BULL. 5 (1959); Mac-
Intyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7
ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 116-17 (1962); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement
by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage
Suit, 61 YAiu L. J. 1010 (1952).
4298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962).
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required. Before analyzing the narrow question involved, it is
first necessary to examine the existing law in the general area of
refusals to deal, and in the particular area of the simple unilateral
refusal to deal.6
II. THE LAW GOVERNING REFUSALS TO DEAL
The area in which most of the law concerning refusals to deal
has arisen is that of resale price maintenance.7 Even before the
classic case of United States v. Colgate & Co.,s a price maintenance
agreement by contract was construed as a violation of the Sher-
man Act,9 and a right to refuse to deal was recognized.10 The
Colgate case has been the basis for most decisions in the area of
refusals to deal, and an examination of the law from Colgate to
the present is necessary to an understanding of the field even though
it has been suggested that Colgate is no longer controlling." The
indictment in Colgate was interpreted by the trial court as failing
to charge a violation of the Sherman Act.12 The same view of the
indictment was taken by the Supreme Court which regarded the
indictment as failing to charge agreement between Colgate and its
dealers with whom the company had refused to deal if the dealer
6 An extensive discussion of the law in this area can be found in Barber,
Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955).
7 For a thorough discussion of the history and the law in the resale price
maintenance area see Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban
on Resale Price Maintenance, THE SUPREME COURT REViEW 258 (Kurland
ed. 1960).
8 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
9 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
A resale price agreement or contract is allowed in the situation where a
state has a "fair trade" law authorized by the McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 631
(1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958). It is only in the area where such a
"fair trade" law does not exist that this prohibition against the price
maintenance agreement is relevant. This exemption from the antitrust
laws has been condemned as "an unwarranted compromise of the basic
tenets of National antitrust policy." ATr'y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST
REP. 154 (1955) (hereinafter cited as Ar'y GEN. REP.).
10 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat, 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir.
1915); Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir.
1909); Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S.D.N.Y.
1919).
"United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 49 (1960) (Mr. Justice
Harlan dissenting).
1226 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1959).
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failed to follow the specified resale.'3 The Court, in taking this ap-
proach, stated: 14
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the Act does not restrict the long-recognized right of a trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to ex-
ercise his own independent discretion as to the parties with whom
he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the cir-
cumstances under which he will refuse to sell.
The holding in Colgate was not nearly as broad as it might
appear. The only stated exception to the right to refuse to deal was
the existence of a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, but
it was readily apparent that there were limits upon the right.
Earlier, in the Dr. Miles case' 5 the Court had held that a contract
for the purpose of resale price maintenance was illegal. United
States v. A. Schrader's Son., Inc.,16 extended this rule to implied
agreements, making clear the difference between the simple uni-
lateral refusal to deal and the situation where there was agreement
-express or implied, thus making it clear that Dr. Miles had not
been overruled. In a subsequent case'17 it was stipulated that resale
prices had not been contractually agreed upon, but the Court found
unlawful conduct where the methods used were such that competi-
tion was suppressed and the essential agreement could be found
from the methods used.'8
13 The view that Colgate may be regarded as simply a matter of the Court's
interpretation of the indictment has been effectively criticized as too
simple and inaccurate. See Levi, supra note 7, at 284-94.
14 250 U.S. 300, 307.
'r 200 U.S. 373 (1911).
16 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
1T FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
18 In similar cases where the methods used so involve the customer that
agreement can be found there is an unlawful refusal to sell. See cases
cited in Barber, supra note 6, at n.31. As Barber points out, the Court in
Beech-Nut prohibited the refusal to sell only when pursuant to "coopera-
tive methods in which the respondent and its distributors, customers
and agents undertake to prevent others from obtaining the company's
products at less than the prices designated by it." Id. at 854. See also
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), in
which the Court stated: "In a business .. . which deals in a specialty
of a luxury or near-luxury character, the right to select its customers
may well be the most essential factor in the maintenance of the highest
standards of service. We are, as the District Court apparently was, loath
to deny Soft-Lite this privilege of selection." Id. at 728-29. The govern-
ment had requested that the distributor Soft-Lite be required to sell
its product without discrimination to any person offering to pay cash
for it.
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The latest consideration of the Colgate doctrine and its limits is
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,19 where the government al-
leged. a combination and conspiracy in violation of the Sherman
Act. Parke-Davis, the defendant, refused to deal with wholesalers
who sold products to retailers merchandising at minimum prices.
Simple refusals to deal were used, along with inducements to dealers
who helped promote compliance with the scheme. In the district
court it was expressly found that "Parke, Davis did not combine,
conspire, or enter into agreement, understanding or concert of ac-
tion,"20 and the case was dismissed on the ground that the action
taken by Parke, Davis came within the Colgate doctrine. The Su-
preme Court, however, regarded this scheme as going beyond the
limits of Colgate. Mr. Justice Brennan, noting that the earlier cases
meant "no more than that a simple refusal to sell to customers who
will not resell at prices suggested by the seller is permissible under
the Sherman Act, ' 21 wrote: 22
[T]here results the same economic effect as is accomplished by a
prohibited combination to suppress price competition if each cus-
tomer, although induced to do so solely by a manufacturer's an-
nounced policy, independently decides to observe specified resale
prices. So long as Colgate is not overruled, this result is tolerated
but only when it is the consequence of a mere refusal to sell....
When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere an-
nouncement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal and he
employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices,
the countervailing consideration is not present and therefore he has
put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act.
The manufacturer who goes beyond an announcement of policy and
a mere refusal to sell may well fall within Parke, Davis, but the
exact limits of the case and the place of Colgate are difficult to
ascertain.23 The area left within which a refusal to deal can be
19362 U.S. 29 (1960). Prior to Parke, Davis private litigants suing for
damages resulting from a unilateral refusal to sell for failure to main-
tain resale prices have been unsuccessful. See Handler, Annual Review
of Antitrust Developments, 15 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 362, 367 (1960) and
cases therein cited.
20 164 F. Supp. 827, 835-36 (D.D.C. 1958).
21362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960).
22 Id. at 44.
23 1Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent pronounced Colgate as a dead doctrine
and charged that the Court while professing respect for Colgate had
eviscerated it in application. Id. at 49, 57. Mr. Justice Stewart concurred
and refused to question the vitality of Colgate since an illegal combina-
tion to maintain resale prices had been shown. Id. at 49. See Levi, supra
note 7, at 319-26. See the discussion in Turner, The Definition of Agree-
ment Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusas to
Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655, 686-91 (1962), which concludes that Colgate
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utilized has been characterized as one of "such Doric simplicity
as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise."24
The right to refuse to deal was limited in Colgate to the situa-
tion where there was an "absence of a purpose to create or main-
tain a monopoly." 25 Section 2 of the Sherman Act 26 will prohibit
the refusal to deal when such action is part of a scheme either to
monopolize or extend an otherwise lawful monopoly. In Eastern
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,2 7 a refusal to sell to
the Kodak dealer was unlawful since the refusal was part of an
attempt to monopolize. In the absence of the application of section 2
this case would be no different from other cases where a dealer
who has been cut off has had no recourse against the supplier's re-
fusal to sell.28 In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States"s a refusal
to sell was also brought within section 2 in an unlawful attempt
to monopolize. Here the newspaper had refused to sell advertising
to persons who had advertised on a radio station in another com-
munity. Even though the Journal could refuse to sell in many situ-
ations, it could not use its position as a "substantial monopoly in
insofar as it may protect such policies from condemnation on the ground
that no agreements are involved should be sent to a "long-overdue
repose."
24 Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960).
25 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
26 "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ... " 26 STAT. 209
(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1959).
27273 U.S. 359 (1927). See United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc.,
63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945), in which the refusal to sell to a distributor
who had underbid the supplier on a contract was held a violation where
the supplier was the only one but where there were many close substi-
tutes. See also Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). For a discussion of this area see NEALE, THE ANTrrRUST
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMAERICA 135-39 (1960).
28 See cases cited in Barber, supra note 6, at nn.1 & 45.
29 342 U.S. 143 (1951). A similar case is Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), in which a contract requiring an
advertiser to advertise in both the morning and evening papers was
found to be lawful. The difference between Lorain Journal and this
case may lie in the lack of specific intent in the latter and the lack of
a dominant market position. See Barber, supra note 6, at 865-66. In § 2
cases it is necessary to establish the necessary market power; for the
difference between this and § 1 cases see United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
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its area"30 and extend itself through a refusal to sell. A very use-
ful case in this particular area is United States v. Griffith,3 hold-
ing that specific intent is not required, and applying section 2 to
the use of a monopoly position when the power is used to foreclose
competition or to attempt to gain a competitive advantage. Thus,
finding an unlawful refusal to deal in a case involving the req-
uisite market power is made easier. Also, it has been held that, in
a section 2 case, the seller who discontinues merchandising to a cus-
tomer is in a position of having to justify the refusal to sell.3 2
While a mere refusal to deal may still be lawful, a refusal to
deal when there is concerted action by more than one party is un-
lawful. When the party joins with others to do what he can law-
fully do by himself, the result may be a group boycott which has
long been unlawful.3 3 The group boycott and combined refusals
to deal are now per se illegal.34 Beyond the above, the doctrines
of conspiracy, intra-corporate conspiracy, and conscious parallelism
are important in controlling the unilateral refusal to deal.8 5 In
Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,6 a cut-off dealer alleged
30 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951).
31 334 U.S. 100 (1948). For a discussion of this area of abuse of monoply
position see Levi, A Two Level Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 567,
580-85 (1952).
2 Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484
(lst Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952). Justification of the
unilateral refusal to deal may be found for a variety of reasons. See
Draper, Unilateral Refusals to Deal Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
4 ANTrrRuST BULL. 785, 791-94 (1959), and cases therein cited.
33 Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600 (1914).
34 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961), commented on in 1961 DUKE L.J. 302 (1961); Klors, Inc. v.
Broad-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). For discussion of the per
se status of the boycott see Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 91-98 (1959); Rahl, Per Se Rules
and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's
Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959). Failure to plead public injury as an
essential part of the action is no longer required since Klors established
the per se status in this type of case.
35 See generally ATT'Y GEN. REP. 30; Barber, supra note 6, at 882; Kessler
& Stern, supra note 34, at 86; Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely
Between a Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf in Un-
reasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act?, 11 FED. B.J. 130 (1951); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-
Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950); Turner, supra note 23, at 655;
Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE
L.J. 372 (1954).
36 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 925 (1953).
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a combination or conspiracy between Motorola and its officials.
The court rejected such a concept of a combination or conspiracy
and dismissed the complaint.37 Thus, it is clear that conscious paral-
lel action by itself is not enough,38 and that the courts require more
than mere inferences drawn from parallel refusals to deal.39
Section 3 of the Clayton Act,40 which prohibits certain sales-on-
conditions such as a tie-in arrangement, has not been interpreted
to allow suits by buyers cut off from their suppliers. 41 This view
of the application of section 3 to the dealer who is cut off has not
remained unchallenged,42 and it would seem that a refusal to sell
singly a particular item could be regarded as a prohibited tying
arrangement.43 Even if the Clayton Act is not involved, actions
brought by cut off dealers have uniformly failed." It has been sug-
37 This decision has been considered correct by the Attorney General's
Committee. ATTfY GEN. REP. 31. It is to be noted that a group of cor-
porate employees could be guilty of violating §§ 1 and 2; White Bear
Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942); Pat-
terson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S.
635 (1915). But no case has found a conspiracy in the situation where
there is no charge of violating § 2 also. Where a parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship, or a similar relationship, exists, agreements may violate § 1.
See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211(1951). Kessler & Stern, supra note 34, at 90, approve the application of
intra-corporate conspiracy but would limit it to the refusal to deal area.
38Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541 (1954). The Court stated that " 'conscious parallelism' has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." See Turner, supra
note 23, at 706: "Consciously parallel decisions by competitors which
are induced by the demand of a buyer from or seller to the group, and
which are not interdependent, should not be held to constitute a hori-
zontal agreement or participation in a vertical-horizontal conspiracy."
39See Barber, supra note 6, at 883.
4038 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Conditioning the sale or lease
of one commodity on the sale or lease of another is commonly described
as a tying arrangement which falls within § 3.
41 ATT'Y GEN. REP. 136 n.28; Barber, supra note 6, at 860 n.52; Kessler &
Stern, supra note 34, at 85. The rationale of this interpretation is that
the dealer is injured by the absence of a sale rather than an unlawful
sale on condition.
42 Turner, supra note 23, at 694 n.54.
4 3 ATY'Y GEN. REP. 136.
44 See cases cited in Barber, supra note 6, at nn.42 & 45. For detailed
treatment of other areas concerning exclusive dealing and refusals to
deal, see Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws-A Reappraisal, 40 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1962); Paley, Antitrust Pitfalls
in Exclusive Dealing: Recent Developments Under the Sherman, Clayton
and FTC Acts, 37 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 499 (1962).
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gested that unilateral refusals to sell should come within the un-
warranted price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act 45 but such a view has not been accepted by the courts.40
Injunctive relief, when granted, does not usually go to the
extent of forcing sales. For example, in United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co.4 7 the Court refused to require the defendant to
"sell its products, without discrimination, to any person offering
to pay cash therefor."48 In another case the court refused to issue
a preliminary injunction enjoining a refusal to sell under section 2
of the Clayton Act.49 However, compulsory sales provisions in a
contested decree have been regarded as a "recognized remedy" by
the Supreme Court in a patent case.50 The use of such a remedy in
the patent area is not unusual,51 but the duty to deal has thus far
been limited to this area.
III. SIMPLICITY AND BERGEN-THE REFUSAL
TO DEAL IN ANOTHER CONTEXT
It is clear that refusals to deal to enforce resale prices are un-
lawful if they go beyond a "mere announcement" and the simple
refusal to deal. Outside of the resale price maintenance area, the
refusal to deal for any purpose, in the absence of conspiracy or
monopoly, is not necessarily unlawful. It is not the refusal itself,
but rather the object to be accomplished thereby, which is unlaw-
45 The Robinson-Patman Act is § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958). This approach is suggested by
Comment, Refusal to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE
L.J. 1121, 1132-34 (1949).
46See Barber, supra note 6, at 848-51. But see ATT'Y GEN. REP. 135,
regarding § 2 (e) of the Act.
47 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
48 Id. at 728. See note 18 supra for the Court's statement regarding the
defendant's right to select its own customers.
49 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 566 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915). See the discussion regarding refusals
to sell as being within the Robinson-Patman Act at notes 45 and 46 supra.
5 0 Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 447 (1952).
51 Similar provisions to that in Besser can be found in United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 94 (1950); United States v. Na-
tional Lead, 332 U.S. 319, 338 (1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd.,
61 F. Supp. 656 (D. Del. 1945). See ATT'y GEN. REP. 255-59; Seegert,
Compulsory Licensing by Judicial Action: A Remedy for Misuse of
Patents, 47 M1cn. L REV. 613 (1949); Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 77 (1946).
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ful. Two recent cases, Simplicity Pattern52 and Bergen Drug,53 in-'
volving the question of enjoining a refusal to sell to a buyer who
has brought an antitrust suit, deserve examination to see if such
conduct is an antitrust violation and can be fitted within the anti-
trust prohibitions. If such a method of deterring antitrust suits is
a violation so that the court may issue an injunction under section 16
of the Clayton Act,54 is this conduct to be enjoined on the basis
of the court's equity power to deal with conduct which obstructs
effective enforcement of the laws?
1. TBE CASES IN THE DIsTPucT COURT
a. Husserl-Simplicity in the district court
The action against Simplicity in the district court, P. W. Hus-
serl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,55 came as a result of the suc-
cessful Federal Trade Commission suit 6 against the company for
violations of section 2 (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.57 The pat-
tern company had discriminated between small retail stores and
large customers by favoring the latter in methods of payment
and in transportation costs. In so doing, Simplicity had violated the
Act, but apparently did so in good faith.58 In accordance with Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act,59 a treble damage suit was commenced
by forty-three retail store owners,6 0 who relied upon the previous
52 House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1962), reversing P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp.
55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), noted in 62 CoLum. L. REv. 18 (1962).
53 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962),
reversing 1961 Trade Cas. ff 70151 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 1961) (oral opinion).
54 This statute is set out in note 2 supra. It is to be noted that § 16 requires
"threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws" before
injunctive relief may be had. (Emphasis added.)
55 P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
N FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
57 Section 2 (e) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to dis-
criminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or
purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing,
by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnish-
ing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling,
sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 38 STAT. 730
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1958).
58 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. at 61 n.4.
5938 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). See note 1 supra for the text
of this statute.
60 The action was originally brought by P. W. Husserl, Inc., Paul Husserl,
and Smiles Stores. However, in a spurious class action, the additional
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decision as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.61 Plain-
tiffs were small retailers who found it necessary to stock patterns
in order to boost their sales of fabrics. For various reasons Sim-
plicity patterns are such that there are no adequate substitutes.
More than half the patterns sold in stores similar to those of plain-
tiffs were produced by Simplicity. The sale of each pattern usually
brings a sale in other materials, and the demand for this type of
pattern is such that a permanent loss of customers could occur as
a result of the denial of their source of supply.62
Plaintiffs' five-year contracts with Simplicity could be ter-
minated by either party on sixty days notice. The contracts of six
of the plaintiffs were either terminated at the end of the term or
upon such notice. There was no indication that contracts of dealers
other than plaintiffs were cancelled. Two of the plaintiffs were
informed that their contracts would not be renewed unless they
would withdraw from the action. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction restraining Simplicity from refusing to deal with them.
It was contended that they would suffer irreparable injury, and
that the contracts were cancelled solely as a punitive measure
against them for pursuing their legal rights, and as part of a plan
to deter other retail stores from bringing similar actions. The dis-
trict court found for the plaintiffs stating that these cancellations
were part of a "deliberate plan to cancel contracts of all those who
elect to assert their rights . . .for the purpose of deterring suit
through the exercise of economic coercion."63 In reaching this "in-
escapable conclusion" the district court rejected attempts by Sim-
plicity to show that the basis for the refusal was justifiable as a
business practice. Claims that some of the plaintiffs were slow
payers, had previously attempted to cancel their contracts, had
contracts which were unprofitable, and could claim continuing
plaintiffs were allowed to intervene. See P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
61 A final judgment or decree rendered in a government suit is prima facie
evidence against the defendant as to matters which would constitute
an estoppel between the parties, but consent decrees are excluded from
this application. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1958). For
analysis of this section, § 5 of the Clayton Act, see Timberlake, The Use
of Government Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage
Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991 (1961); Note,
Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage Suitors?, 61 YALE L.J. 417(1952).
62 p. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
3Id. at 59.
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treble damages if the contract was not cancelled were regarded as
unconvincing.
b. Bergen
The facts in the Bergen case are quite similar to those in Sim-
plicity. Here the plaintiff, a distributor of pharmaceutical products,
brought an action in the district court asking treble damages and
injunctive relief for alleged violations of section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 2 of the Clayton Act.0 4 In this case, however, no
contract was involved since the plaintiff purchased supplies from
Parke, Davis as needed, and upon prices reached by agreement
between the parties. It was conceded that the previously existing
relationships did not create any vested right in Bergen to continue
to purchase the defendant's products as desired. 65 Following the
commencement of the suit, Parke, Davis notified the plaintiff that
it was permanently terminating their business relationship. Plain-
tiff, alleging irreparable damage to itself and its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, sought an injunction pendente lite asking that defendant
be enjoined from cancelling the account, from refusing to fill orders,
and requiring defendant to sell and deliver merchandise in the
same manner as was done for other wholesalers. The refusal to
sell was, in the words of the court, "actuated by a feeling of either
resentment or disapproval of the pending litigation instituted
against the defendant by the plaintiff."066 It was argued that Parke,
Davis had a patent monopoly over some of the merchandise, mak-
ing it economically essential that plaintiff, a full-line distributor, be
supplied with these articles.0 7 It was shown, however, that plain-
tiff could still obtain these supplies from other distributors or re-
tailers, although to do so would cause pecuniary damage, and that
Parke, Davis itself did sell directly to retailers. 8 Even though the
plaintiff could obtain Parke, Davis products from other sources,
about twenty-five per cent of its orders required the use of de-
641Bergen Drug Co., v. Parke, Davis & Co., 1961 Trade Cas. ff 70151 (D.N.J.
1961).
65 Id. at 78,585.
66 Id. at 78,583.
67 Id. at 78,585. This approach suggests a possible argument that the duty
to deal as used in the patent area could be applied here. See text at notes
50 and 51 supra.
68 1d. at 78,584-85. However, if the plaintiff would be unable to obtain
these supplies from other distributors or retailers as a result of any type
of agreement with each other or with Parke, Davis or as a result of
adherence to demands on the part of Parke, Davis, a situation similar
to a boycott which is illegal per se or a conspiracy to restrain trade may
exist. See notes 34 and 35 supra.
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fendant's products. A substantial loss of good will and permanent
loss of business would probably occur if Bergen Drug did not pro-
vide service equal to that of other wholesalers.
c. The rationale of the district courts.
Here, as in the appellate courts, contrary results were reached
in these parallel situations. In Husserl (Simplicity in the district
court) the injunction was granted; in Bergen it was denied. Judge
Bryan in Husserl, in referring to the right not to sell, noted that
it is not "unlimited and must under appropriate circumstances give
way to considerations of public policy which require its reasonable
restriction in the public interest."6 9 This view is extended to the
point where, if the "purpose is unlawful, there is no absolute right
to refuse to deal in the untrammeled discretion of the trader."70 This
approach is quite similar to the dicta in a few cases which have
equated economic coercion with restraints of trade, and which
have said that the refusal must not be used for unlawful pur-
poses.7 1 This approach, which is not generally accepted, is not
without merit, as the result in Husserl shows. The question of its
validity and implications will be left for later discussion.
After reviewing the various statutory provisions relating to
private actions, the court in Husserl stated: 72
In the case at bar the refusal to deal is a bold attempt on the part
of defendant Simplicity to deter litigants by economic coercion
from pursuing the lawful remedies granted them by Congress
under the anti-trust laws. Congress envisaged such private suitors
as "allies of the government in enforcing the anti-trust laws." To
permit private suitors in that position to be coerced from pursuing
the remedies which Congress gave them would frustrate the public
policy which motivated Congress to grant such remedies. It would
permit violators of great economic strength to rest secure from
remedial and punitive action by private litigants through the ex-
ercise of their economic power. Such a result cannot be tolerated
by the courts if the policies enunciated by Congress are to be car-
ried out.
Previous cases were distinguished as not pursuing an objective
69 191 F. Supp. at 61.
70 Ibid.
71A. C. Becken v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 962 (1960); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); G. & P. Amusement Co. v.
Regent Theater Co., 107 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ohio 1952), affd. mem.,
216 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 904 (1955). See also
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (dissenting opinion).
72 191 F. Supp. at 61.
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inimical to the purposes and policies of the law. In a balancing of
interests, the court stated that the right to refuse to deal must
give way to "overriding considerations of the strong public policy
[behind private actions] .1 73 Since the section 16 requirement of ir-
reparable loss to plaintiff had been established, and since defendant
would suffer no appreciable loss, relief was granted.
The district court in Bergen, after reference to Husserl, refused
to issue an injunction since there was no vested right in the plain-
tiff to receive the products and since, even if plaintiff would suc-
ceed in the main action, the defendant "might be or would be at
liberty, whatever its motives, short of violations of the antitrust
laws, to cease doing business with the plaintiff."1 4 The Husserl ap-
proach of balancing the right to refuse to deal against the public
policy was rejected, and the court indicated that Parke, Davis' re-
action to a lawsuit was quite natural, and was the natural risk of
bringing such an action. The court found it "quite a novel pre-
cedent to chain two litigating parties together in a business re-
lationship in the continuance of which neither has a vested interest
at the outset of litigation," and found no interference with the op-
eration of the antitrust laws.75 Although in a particular case there
may be no such interference with the antitrust laws, the view in
Husserl of the effect of such a refusal to deal would in most cases
seem closer to reality.
2. SnMPLicy mm BE-GEN ON APPEAL
a. Simplicity
House of Materials was the only plaintiff in the Husserl case
to post the necessary bond. The other five plaintiffs evidently had
found other sources for obtaining patterns. The Second Circuit,
speaking through Judge Kaufman, reversed the district court on
grounds that the injunction could not be sustained under section 16,
and that the exercise of equity power was unwarranted. The ap-
pellate court did not use or discuss the balancing of public policy
considerations. According to the court of appeals, there was no
statutory authority for the injunction since there was no violation
of the antitrust laws. It was noted that the district court
appears to have found by implication in section 4 of the Clayton
Act a prohibition against coercing persons who bring treble dam-
ages actions to discontinue them.... [S]uch an implication is un-
warranted, for we find nothing in the language or purpose of the
73 Id. at 62.
74 1961 Trade Cas. 70151, at 78,585.
75 Ibid.
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statute which suggests that Congress intended to force manufac-
turers to deal with persons who sue them, while not forcing them
to deal with others.76
It was noted that in enacting the Clayton Act Congress had rejected
a proposal to prohibit arbitrary refusals to sell. Since there was
no indication that Congress intended such action to be an antitrust
violation the court said: "[W]e cannot justify through improper
judicial 'interpretation' of a section of the antitrust laws what
amounts to an extension of the remedies given by Congress under
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. '77 Likewise there was no violation
of the Clayton Act, and the court thought that this was "too plain
to merit discussion.37 8
The "deliberate" plan found by the district court in Husserl
was rejected. Since House of Materials was the only original plain-
tiff to appeal, this may be correct; but the fact that House of Ma-
terials and another original plaintiff had not been told that the
contract would not be renewed while they were parties to the
suit, and that it would be renewed if they withdrew, was over-
looked.79 There was, according to the court of appeals, a "mere
announcement" and a "simple refusal to deal"--a case of lawful
"Doric" simplicity.80 No other basis was found upon which a com-
bination or conspiracy argument could rest; and even if such a
combination did exist, the court could find no unreasonable re-
straint of trade. The general equity power of the court to grant
such injunctive relief to protect the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem was admitted. But the court said that such an injunction
would be "singularly inappropriate" in this case8' since it would
conflict with the right to refuse to sell, and would give the plaintiff
more rights by suing than he had under his contract. Beyond this,
plaintiff could not acquire additional contract rights by an applica-
tion of tort principles to this form of business coercion.82
b. Bergen
In contrast to the Simplicity decision, the Third Circuit in
Bergen Drug not only considered the policy and importance of
76 House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 871 n.11
(2d Cir. 1962).
77 Id. at 871.
78 Id. at 871. See notes 45 and 46 supra.
79 191 F. Supp. at 58.
80 298 F.2d at 870.
81 Id. at 872.
82 Ibid.
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effective private enforcement of the antitrust laws, but considered
these as weighing "heavily with this court in considering whether
equity jurisdiction should be exercised."8 3 The starting point for
the court was the existence of equity power to issue the preliminary
injunction. The court found that it did have power to issue such
an injunction, citing Simplicity and an analogous case in which
such an injunction was issued.84 It is clear that section 16 should
not preclude the exercise of equity power, but the court did not
discuss the point, nor did it discuss the possibility of there being an
antitrust violation which would bring section 16 into operation.
Rather than finding the refusal to be one of "Doric" simplicity,
Colgate's section 2 exception of monopolizing or attempting to
monopolize was used to find that case "inapposite."85 In referring to
Colgate, and indicating the basis of its decision, the court stated:8 0
In [Colgate] . . . the Supreme Court qualified its statement con-
cerning a seller's freedom to choose customers by indicating that
the rule would not apply where there is a purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly. The undisputed facts here are that the buyer-
seller relationship was discontinued because of the filing of the
main action. True enough, the defendant can choose customers,
but it should not be permitted to do so in order to stifle the main
action, especially where it is apparent that such conduct will
further the monopoly which plaintiff alleges defendant is attempt-
ing to bring about and which, if proved, would entitle plaintiff to
permanent relief .... The possibility that the court may decide
the right to permanent relief adversely to plaintiff does not pre-
clude it from granting the temporary relief.
When a party's conduct is calculated to frustrate litigation, the
court may act. In this case the main action cannot successfully be
prosecuted since plaintiff "will be unable to secure the coopera-
tion of other wholesalers and of retailers to be witnesses because
they fear the same sort of retaliatory action that plaintiff has ex-
perienced. ' 87 The court, noting the relative burdens of the parties,
and finding little inconvenience on the defendant and irreparable
83 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962).
84 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962). In this case the
court allowed a preliminary injunction allowing plaintiff to keep his
automobile franchise pending a determination of the issues. See the
discussion of the applicable statute and its implications at notes 115-18
infra.
85 307 F.2d at 727.
86 Ibid. While Colgate itself may be "inapposite" here, the gloss upon it
certainly is not, and this approach ignores the justifications for the
refusal to deal which the defendant could utilize. See note 32 supra.
87 Id. at 728.
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harm to the plaintiff, granted the injunction pendente lite com-
pelling Parke, Davis to deal with Bergen.
3. CONTRASTS AND ANALYSIS
One possible basis for a distinction between Bergen and Sim-
plicity is the allegation in Bergen of an attempt to monopolize in
violation of the Sherman Act.88 The court in Bergen had noted
that the gravamen of the main claim was discriminatory dealing,
monopolizing and attempts to monopolize which were unrelated
to Colgate. While the defendant can choose customers, it cannot
do so to destroy the main action, "especially where it is apparent
that such conduct will further the monopoly which plaintiff alleges
defendant is attempting to bring about ... 2,89 It is true, of course,
that plaintiff is entitled to permanent relief upon proving the sec-
tion 2 violation, but this does not necessarily mean that temporary
relief is justified, especially when the right to refuse to sell is bal-
anced against it. In such a case the defendant has the burden of
proving the justification of the refusal to sell °0 In effect, this is
a determination that a refusal to deal when the purpose is to stifle
the main action is not sufficient justification. Further relief, once
the allegation is proven, is not foreclosed if the injunction is not al-
lowed; but, as a practical matter, proving the allegation would be
impossible since the other wholesalers and retailers would not
testify for fear of similar economic retaliation.
While the above points may be valid, this does not necessarily
provide a basis for reconciling the two cases. In the first place,
such a distinction is not essential to the decision in Bergen. Both
cases recognize the existence of equity power in such circumstances,
but reach a contrary result as to its application. It would have
been possible to have decided Bergen the same way even if an
antitrust violation other than section 2 were alleged, if the purpose
of the refusal to deal were to frustrate litigation. The prevention
of interference with the enforcement of a legal right, rather than
the basis of the legal right, is the vital point. Secondly, while the
allegation of an attempt to monopolize is not present in Simplicity,
88It must be noted that in Simplicity the court noted that there was no
allegation of a § 2 violation in any manner. 298 F.2d at 871. In National
Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exch., Inc., 305 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1962), the
court distinguished Simplicity on that basis. Id. at 654. However Na-
tional Screen did not involve the question involved in Simplicity or
Bergen and granted an injunction under § 16.
89 307 F.2d at 727.
90 Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
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the market position of Simplicity is much larger and makes a
stronger case for the economic argument of the effect upon a com-
petitive market than does the market share of Parke, Davis.91
Finally, a distinction based upon the difference between the case
where a Sherman Act, section 2, violation is alleged and the case
wvhere no attempt at monopolization is involved (as in Simplicity
where the Robinson-Patman Act was the basis of the main action)
is in effect a judgment that such relief should be granted under
the Sherman Act but not under Robinson-Patman.9 2 Such an ap-
proach has been suggested and it certainly follows from the possi-
ble bases of distinction being discussed9 3 However, one statutory
91 More than half of the patterns sold in the retail stores were Simplicity
Patterns which could not be obtained except from Simplicity, the largest
producer whose size was greater than that of all other major producers
combined. The district court in Husserl had noted the dominant market
position of the defendant and found the plaintiffs to be placed at a
severe competitive disadvantage. 191 F. Supp. at 63-64. On the other
hand, Parke, Davis' position in the market is substantially less than
Simplicity's. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827(D.D.C. 1958), for the findings of the district court regarding the market
position of the defendant in the market area in question, the figures
for which should be closed to that area in the present case. Still, about
25% of Bergen's orders require a Parke, Davis product, but these
products, as contrasted to the patterns, could be obtained elsewhere.
92 It was previously noted that Simplicity had acted in good faith in violat-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act, and this fact was not unnoticed by the
court in the present case. 298 F.2d at 872 n.12. This is a reflection of the
attitude of those who see an inherent unfairness in subjecting unwitting
violators of the Robinson-Patman Act to the same treble damages as the
intentional violator of the Sherman Act must face. This has led to pro-
posals to allow discretionary treble damages rather than mandatory
treble damages. See ATT'Y GEN. REP. 378-80. This proposal has been
effectively attacked. See Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The
Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
When these considerations are transferred into the area of refusing
to deal to deter the private litigant, the argument can be changed some-
what. When the private litigant brings an action under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, he is acting under a statute which has as one of its purposes
the policy of balancing the buyer's economic inequality vis vis his
supplier. To accept the argument that unwitting violators should not be
subjected to mandatory treble damages is to ignore the purposes of
the act, and this is particularly true in the present case where the
refusal to deal is to prevent an action from being brought at all.
93This distinction appears to be accepted by the writer in Comment,
Discouragement of Private Treble Damage Suits Through a Simple
Refusal to Deal, 71 YALE L.J. 1565, 1577 (1962). An interesting situation
is presented if the action in Simplicity was not based upon a prior gov-
ernment suit and was simply a private action alleging Robinson-Patman
Act violations. The distinction breaks down here since the violation of
Robinson-Patman would be a violation of the antitrust laws without
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enactment cannot be regarded as more important than the other,
especially when the policies behind each are different; and this
is particularly true when the basis for injunctive relief is the same
in both cases. The injunction is issued to protect the private action
and to prevent interference with litigation, regardless of what type
antitrust violation is being alleged. Furthermore, the equities of
the situation may actually favor the plaintiff in the price discrimina-
tion area, since the Robinson-Patman Act is designed to overcome
the inequality of the buyer, and thus the argument in favor of an
injunction is stronger in this case than in the case where a Sherman
Act violation is alleged.
When Bergen and Simplicity are analyzed from the standpoint
of whether it was appropriate to exercise equity jurisdiction, it is
difficult to find significant differences to justify the contrary re-
sults. Both House of Materials and Bergen Drug were in the posi-
tion of suffering severe losses if the injunction were not granted.
Simplicity patterns, which were of great value in the plaintiff's
business could not be obtained elsewhere; and, while Parke, Davis
products could be obtained from other sources, there was no show-
ing that this could be done under the same terms as plaintiff had
purchased them from the defendant 4 Even if Bergen could obtain
the supplies elsewhere, there was a possible loss of good will and a
permanent loss of business if its customers' orders could not be
filled. Despite the fact that Bergen had no vested rights to the
products since it did not operate under a contract, its position is
really no different from a plaintiff operating under a terminable
contract which does not necessarily grant such a vested right 5
The, fact that Bergen requested permanent injunctive relief if suc-
cessful in the main action is not determinative since the underlying
reason which would compel the issuance of the temporary injunc-
tion remains the same. In each case the position of the defendant
is not significantly changed by being compelled to continue to deal,
the argument of the necessity of protecting unwitting violators from
treble damage suits being present. Such a case shows well that the
type of distinction discussed is not valid in the present context unless
the Robinson-Patman Act is in such disfavor that violators are to be
protected in such a manner, in which case the change is for Congress
rather than the courts.
94 307 F.2d at 728.
95 One of the plaintiffs in P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191
F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), did have a possible breach of contract action.
Id. at 58. But the plaintiff was not a party in the Court of Appeals.
Quaere, whether this type of action could justify the use of the tort
doctrine of unlawful business compulsion to compel the issuance of the
injunction?
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and there is no doubt that in both cases the refusal was prompted
by the antitrust action. The point regarding the difference between
the intentions of the defendants has been discussed above; and
while this does, of course, affect the equities, an argument can be
made that the equities can be reversed on the basis of the policy
behind the Robinson-Patman Act.9 6
Since Bergen and Simplicity are not different, either factually
as to the precise issue, or as to the equities involved, questions
arise as to the right to exercise equity powers, and the proper public
policy which may call for its exercise in an appropriate situation.
The court in Simplicity granted that such a power did exist, but
regarded this case as "singularly inappropriate" for its exercise.9 7
On the other hand, Bergen did not discuss the application of section
16, but started with the proposition that such power did exist. The
view that section 16 removed the equity power of a court to deal
with the present situation cannot be accepted unless it can be shown
that this was the intent of Congress. Even though Congress may
provide a legal right without granting the power to effectively
enforce it, this does not necessarily preclude the exercise of equity
power.9 8 While the court in Simplicity did not weigh the considera-
tions favoring private antitrust actions, continued private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, and the necessity of protecting such a
method of enforcement, was stressed in both Husserl and Bergen.
It is this right to private actions for treble damages which is vital
here, and the policy and place of the private action must be ex-
amined.
The private action was created by Congress to make private
parties "allies of the government in enforcing the antitrust laws."99
The role which the private suitor has in the enforcement of these
statutes is shown by the prediction that the Antitrust Division of
the government would have to be quadrupled to equal private
enforcement. 10 The treble damage action is a very important
0 See note 92 supra.
97 298 F.2d at 872.
98 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1962). As to the
power to give equitable relief to make effective a remedy granted by
law, see 4 PolMRoY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1338 (5th ed. 1941), cited
by the court in Bateman.
99 51 CONG. REc. 16319 (1914).
100 Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTi-
TRUST BULL. 167 (1958).
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weapon,101 and its use can be a more effective deterrent to possible
antitrust violators than many other types of actions. 0 2 The de-
terrent value of the private suit is manifested in a variety of ways.
The mere threat of private litigation forces many defendants to en-
ter consent decrees, 1 3 and threatening litigation often brings about
changes in conduct on the part of future defendants hopeful of
avoiding legal action.10 4 Also, a great many private actions are
settled before trial, and many predatory business practices are pre-
vented due to possible legal action if adopted105
The burdens involved in these actions are so great that many
possible plaintiffs are unwilling to bring suit, and it appears that
fear of reprisal plays a very important role in discouraging treble
damage actions and thus destroying the deterrent effect of the pri-
vate action.10 6 The refusal to deal exemplified by Simplicity and
Bergen is a form of reprisal which effectively negates the deterrent
effect of the legal right to damages. The denial of an injunction to
prevent a refusal to deal with the antitrust suitor serves only to
allow a defendant to render ineffective the statutory scheme of
private actions. If equity power does exist outside the scope of
section 16, one cannot imagine a more appropriate set of circum-
stances justifying its exercise than the refusal to sell to deter
private treble damage actions such as existed in Simplicity and
Bergen.
The exercise of equity power to protect a private suitor is not
necessary if this refusal can be fitted within section 16 (requiring
an antitrust violation before the injunction can be issued). There
was no antitrust violation in Simplicity since this was a case of
"Doric" simplicity, and the defendant's actions were nothing more
than a "mere announcement" without any other means of combina-
tion.1 7 In Bergen the question of whether the refusal by itself was
101 Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions,
4 ANTRMUST BULL. 5 (1959); Loevinger, supra note 100, at 167; Wham,
supra note 92, at 1061; Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private
Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE
L.J. 1010 (1952).
102 Bicks, supra note 101, at 8; Loevinger, supra note 100, at 168; Comment,
61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1061 (1952).
103 Bicks, supra note 101, at 8. This is due to the fact that § 5 of the Clayton
Act does not apply to consent decrees. See note 61 supra.
104 Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1060 (1952).
105 Id. at 1059-61.
106 Id. at 1057 n.309.
107 298 F.2d at 870.
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an antitrust violation was not discussed by the court, which dealt
rather with the question of the existence of its equitable power to
grant the requested relief. Could the refusal in these cases have
been found to be an antitrust violation, and section 16 used as the
basis for the injunction? It is possible that the doctrine of United
States v. Griffithl '0 (holding that the use of power to extend itself
is illegal) could be applied here since monopoly power is being
used to prevent the legal action which would limit it. Such an
approach is very doubtful for several reasons. Government action
is not precluded in these cases, and a showing of market power
required in such a case is doubtful under the facts of either
Simplicity or Bergen.1 9 Also, the monopoly here, if it does exist, is
not really being extended. There is no foreclosure of competition,
and the supplier is not gaining market power, but rather is pre-
venting legal action. A presumption of the essential market power
on the basis of product uniqueness is quite difficult since Bergen
still had access to these products.
A more likely basis for finding an antitrust violation is a con-
spiracy or combination theory. Implied conspiracy between the de-
fendant and those dealers who did not sue is one possibility, but
this approach has been labeled as "nonsensical" with some justifica-
tion.1 0 The doctrine of intra-corporate conspiracy could be argued,
but it is clear that this doctrine has not been accepted."' If, in
such a case, co-defendants would refuse to deal with the plaintiffs,
joint action which would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act could
no doubt be found. The assertion of the court in Simplicity that
there is no violation since no restraint of trade could be shown in
such a case is subject to question," 2 and the implied conspiracy
of co-defendants could easily constitute a boycott." 3 Also, any
enlisting of other parties, such as the other wholesalers or retailers
in Bergen, would fall within this prohibition.
Another possible approach is that taken by the district court
in Husserl where the refusal to sell was balanced against other fac-
tors and found to be for an unlawful purpose. This approach though
108United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
109 See note 91 supra.
110 Alexander, Private Antitrust Actions for Refusal to Deal, 6 ST. Louis L.
REV. 489, 500 (1961).
Mn See note 37 supra.
112 298 F.2d at 871.
1 3 For discussion of the boycott which is now illegal per se, see note 34
supra and accompanying text.
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is not sanctioned by the authorities and was rejected in Simplicity.
Such an approach, equating the use of economic coercion with
restraints of trade, ignores the fact that while the action may be
bad public policy, it still is not prohibited by the antitrust laws."4
It seems apparent then that the refusal to deal for the purpose of
deterring private suitors is not by itself prohibited by the antitrust
laws, and the refusal to use section 16 as the basis for the issuance
of an injunction is no doubt correct.
In enacting the Clayton Act Congress had rejected a proposal
to prevent arbitrary refusals to sell in certain areas. 1 5 This type
of compulsion to deal, and the protection of the buyer operating
under economic inequality, has been enacted in the Dealers Day
in Court Act which grants a cause of action to an automobile dealer
whose franchise is cut off or not renewed without "good faith."10
This act does extend the present antitrust law since the manufac-
turer in this area can no longer take refuge in Colgate,"7 and the
Third Circuit has held that an injunction should be issued to make
more effective this statutory right."18 Other legislation which would
in effect compel selling to all persons meeting the terms of the
sale has been proposed,"19 but this cannot be justified when close
substitute products can readily be obtained. 20 The economic argu-
ments upon which these proposals are based are beyond the scope
of this comment, and it is sufficient to say that the enactment of
a broad duty to deal would be far beyond the existing state of the
law, and such changes should come from Congress rather than the
courts. As pointed out previously, however, the enjoining of the
refusal to deal by the court of appeals in Bergen is an exercise of
114 See Alexander, supra note 110, at 501 where he states: "Even if Colgate
had been overruled, actions which do not violate the substantive pro-
visions of the antitrust laws would still seemingly be immune from suit.
The lesser qualification of Colgate which has actually taken place still
cannot be read as establishing a new antitrust law capable of supporting
private suit."
115 H.R. REP. No. 15,657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1914).
116 60 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1958). See Kessler, Automobile
Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135(1957); Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,
69 YALE L.J. 1, 103-10 (1959).
117 Kessler & Stern, supra note 116, at 107.
11" Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962), cited in Bergen
as authority for the exercise of the equity power to prevent interference
with the exercise of the legal right to maintain the action.
119 SEN. Doc. No. 32, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (report to the Senate Small
Business Committee).
120 Kessler & Stern, supra note 116, at 115 n.511.
COMMENTS
equitable power to prevent interference with the operation of the
antitrust laws. On this basis it is submitted that the law as found
in Bergen is not only desirable, but essential to the continued effec-
tive use and protection of the private treble damage action, and
should be upheld. The injunction is not of a permanent nature,
and a defendant can always show justification for the refusal to
deal. Simplicity and Bergen indicate that the refusal will not be
enjoined if oppressive to the seller, and in neither case was this a
serious factor. Thus, an injunction compelling the defendant to
deal until the economic motive of deterring private treble damage
actions is gone should be allowed upon a proper showing of: (1) the
sole purpose of the refusal being that of preventing legal action,
(2) irreparable damage, and (3) lack of substantial damage to the
seller.
IV. CONCLUSION
A seller who is refused further service or supplies has had
very little success in actions against the manufacturer. The reasons
for this lack of success vary from substantive law questions to prob-
lems of proving damages. There has been little recourse for refusals
to deal, and many actions which otherwise would have been brought
have no doubt been prevented by fear of reprisal. An injunction
which prevents refusals to sell for the sole reason that an antitrust
action has been brought will put the private litigant in a much
stronger position. Such an injunction should prevent further re-
prisals intended to deter the bringing of private actions, and
should prevent the threat of reprisals against witnesses which
hinder the presentation of evidence and the proving of damages.
The Bergen case should lead to a strengthening of the antitrust
laws and provide a strong stimulus to the bringing of private treble
damage actions.
The law in the area of unilateral refusals to deal is changed
only to the extent that the refusal is not allowed for the purpose
of deterring treble damage actions. This has been accomplished
through the exercise of the court's power to prevent interference
with the process of litigation. The denial of an injunction in such
a case lacks an appreciation of the difficulties of the private litigant
and the place of private actions. Even though the status of the
refusal to deal has been questioned, the power to refuse to deal,
within limits, is still lawful and correct in the absence of Con-
gressional enactments further restricting the right. But the refusal
should not impede enforcement of legal rights granted by Congress.
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